Demographic, jurisdictional, and spatial effects on social distancing in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic
(with Rajesh Narayanan, R. Kelley Pace, and Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara)
PLOS One, 2020
The efficiency of the benchmark revisions to the current employment statistics (CES) data
(with Keith Phillips)
Economics Letters, 2012
The SEC has expressed concern that some emerging risks – most notably, cybersecurity risk – exhibit an insufficient level and quality of disclosure. Policymakers envision a board role in cybersecurity risk management, but whether that role would effectively improve risk disclosure is an open question. This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether expertise at the board of directors affects cybersecurity risk disclosure. I find that the level and quality of risk disclosure increases when the board has more knowledge about the risk. Thus, board expertise contributes in the identification and disclosure of emerging risk.
Presentations: FMA 2018 Annual Meeting, Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University
Firms with narcissistic CEOs are more likely to experience the turnover of non-CEO executives; this effect is amplified for executives with pay closer to the CEO’s pay. Stock price reactions to narcissism-induced departures are more negative the longer the non-CEO executive’s tenure. If long-tenured non-CEO executives have more valuable human capital, the results imply a relation between CEO narcissism and the loss of valuable human capital. We find parallel results for mass layoffs of non-executive, rank-and-file employees. Our findings imply that CEO narcissism impacts firm value through its effect on the retention of valuable human capital.
Presentations: Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University
What externalities are generated by lender monitoring? When a firm violates a loan covenant, the event may be informative to parties outside of the lender-firm pair that agreed to the covenant term. Using a hierarchical matching estimator, I estimate the spillover effects of covenant violation to other violators and to non-violators in the focal firm’s industry. Covenant violators have ex post renegotiation outcomes that depend upon rival firm violation. This suggests that violation by peers informs the optimal renegotiation outcome following covenant violation. Non-violators benefit competitively from peer violation.
Presentations: Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University, Texas Tech University, University of Melbourne, University of Sydney
Using a network regression framework that allows for joint determination of appointments of directors to firms, we find that there is two-sided matching in board appointments based on a director’s and a firm’s reputation for being management or shareholder friendly. A director is 17 times more likely to join a firm’s board when the director and the firm share similar reputations. The likelihood of matching is stronger when coordination costs for rejecting mismatched directors are lower. Moreover, consistent with theory, we find that a reputational shock to a subset of firms has economy-wide effects on the incentives for directors to change their reputations. Finally, we find that presence of blockholders that have private information about the directors mitigate concerns about mismatch.
Cybersecurity Events and Bank Deposits
(with Rajesh Narayanan)
Auditor liability and management earnings forecasts
(with Zhihong Chen and Nan Yang)